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On Culture and Regional Integration1
 
Søren Dosenrode 
 
 
“Culture is more often a source of conflict than of synergy.  
Cultural differences are a nuisance at best and often a disaster.”      
 
Geert Hofstede, Emeritus Professor, Maastricht University. 
 
 
Argument for the topic of the essay 
The rationale behind writing this working paper on the relation ‘culture - 
regional integration’ is that regional integration is increasingly popular, also 
outside Europe (e.g. the African Union, Mercosur, the processes in South East 
Asia). Thus it is important per se to understand it, as a feature in the relations 
among states. Culture itself, as an element in social science analysis, was ‘in’ in 
the 1940 and 1950s and then ‘out’ until the beginning of the 1990s. This 
working paper aims at looking at a still rather unnoticed relation namely that of 
cultural familiarity as a possible condition for successful regional integration in 
a tentative way. It does so by discussing the concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘regional 
integration’, to establish a preliminary frame of reference. It is followed by an 
overview of (some) approaches to the integration process with a special 
emphasis on their in- or exclusion of ‘culture’. And then follows an attempt to 
set up a working hypothesis and to confront it – very sketchy – with some 
regional integration projects. The working hypothesis is, that shared core and 
manifest cultures are important for the success of regional integration project, 
especially if they aim at constructing state-like entities. But basically this paper 
gives an overview mort that an empirically based analysis. The latter will come 
later. 
 
 
A Few Core Concepts 
 
Culture 
After decades in the darkness, culture has been en vogue within the social 
sciences since the beginning of the 1990s. Perhaps that is no coincidence. 
During the Cold War the World was divided in a few blocks and interest 
spheres, which did not leave much room for variation within the individual 
                                                          
1 This paper is an elaborated version of a contribution, ‘Is a Common Culture a Prerequisite 
for Regional Integration? - An attempt to construct a frame of analysis’, presented at the 
workshop ‘Brudlinjer i Europa? Kultur Integration & Politik’ Aalborg University, April 27th, 
2006.  The project is still very much ‘in progress’. 
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blocks. After the Soviet Union’s falling apart, and the US standing as the only 
superpower, culture diversity has had better changes than before; for better or 
worse.  
 
But what is culture and does it actually matter? To start out Geert Hofstede 
makes a very simple but useful distinction concerning culture, when dividing it 
in ‘Culture one’ and ‘Culture two’ (1991/16). ‘Culture one’ is culture in the 
classical meaning of the word, that is education, refinement, art etc. ‘Culture 
two’ includes the activities in ‘Culture one’ but is broader – very much broader -
, including every days work and routines  like to great, to eat, to love etc. 
Culture in this essay is concerned mainly with ‘Culture two’, but that needs 
further elaboration. Hofstede continues:  
 
“Culture could be defined as the interactive aggregate of common 
characteristics that influence a human group’s response to its environment.  
Culture determines the identity of a human group in the same way as 
personality determines the identity of an individual.” (1980 (1984) / 21). 
 
Hans Gullestrup has made a more cumulative definition of culture with the aim 
of analysing and understanding cultures, across cultures (2003/55, my 
translation): 
 
“Culture is the worldview and the values, rules, moral norms and actual 
conduct – as well as the material and immaterial products and symbols related 
thereto - as human beings (in a given context and over a given time span) take 
over from the previous ‘generation’; which they – eventually in a changed 
form) try to pass over to the next ‘generation’ and which in one or the other 
form differentiates them from human beings belonging to another culture.” 
 
Another definition, less elaborated, comes from Samuel Huntington, who begins 
by warning us, in his 2000 (p. xv) book, that ‘[…] if culture includes everything, 
it explains nothing”, before he goes on defining culture in subjective terms as 
(2000/ xv): “[…] the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying 
assumptions prevalent among people in a society”, a definition Landes (2000/2) 
and Porter (2000/15) also use. Brian M. Fagan writes: ”A culture is a complex 
system, a set of interacting variables – tools, burial customs, ways of getting 
food, religious beliefs, social organisation, and so on – that function to maintain 
a community in a state of equilibrium with its environment”  (cited in Gullestrup 
2003/45). Fagan’s definition trespasses that of Gullestrup and Huntington in so 
far as it insist on the normative function of keeping a culture in equilibrium with 
its environment.2  
                                                          
2 I would consider that a highly questionable claim; the relativistic note it has got allows for 
the existence of both KZ- and Gulag-camps without questioning such ‘phenomena’. 
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Returning to Hofstede, Gullestrup and Huntington, they all include more than 
one level in their analysis of cultures. Hofstede in his famous ‘onion’ model (a 
core (the values), followed by rituals, heroes and as the outer layer, symbols 
(1991/19)). Huntington includes layers or levels already in the definition, and 
Gullestrup in his elaborated frame of analysis. They all agree that there is an 
‘upper’ more or less visible or manifest layer, as well as a ‘deeper’, core 
culture.3  
 
Gullestrup and Huntington have different aims with their respective works; 
Huntington’s book is (1997/13):  “[…] meant to be an interpretation of the 
evolution of global politics after the Cold War. It aspires to present a 
framework, a paradigm, for viewing global politics that will be meaningful to 
scholars and useful to policymakers”. Thus his aim is very specific, conducted at 
the macro level, and very practical oriented, one may say, very Anglo-Saxon. 
Gullestrup’s ambition is different. His aim is to contribute to a deeper 
understanding of the cultural likenesses and differences of human beings, and 
that may make it easier to work in intercultural relations (2003/14). For this 
purpose Gullestrup builds a theoretical approach to analyse cultures. Thus his 
aim is of a general, theoretical nature, one may say, belonging to a continental 
scientific tradition. Due to this ‘higher’ purpose I have chosen Gullestrup’s 
approach as theoretical basis for this essay. 
 
Gullestrup (2003/77-98) has constructed a model consisting of two levels, the 
basic, ‘core-culture’ and the ‘manifest culture’; thus society’s culture has a fairly 
abstract basis which is getting more and more concrete as one passes through the 
layers. The fundament of the core-culture is the ‘fundamental world-view’ (e.g. 
nature of man as described in the Bible or the Koran), followed by the 
‘fundamental values’ (e.g. social responsibility), and the ‘not perceivable 
present’ (e.g. criteria of solidarity). This basic level is followed by the manifest 
level consisting of: the formalised moral- and rules layer (e.g. practical rules for 
how to behave); the difficultly perceivable structural layer (e.g. social- and 
economic structures, administrative processes) and the ‘immediately sensible 
layer’ (e.g. language, songs, law, rules).  
 
                                                          
3 I will leave out Hofstede and his country map model in this analysis i.e. because he, as a 
typical secularised north western European, underestimates the role of religion (1991/27), 
which at least after ‘9.11.’ is not longer possible. For further criticism of Hofstede see Baca et 
al. 1999. 
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(Figure 1: Hans Gullestrup's culture model) 
 
Gullestrup’s model has the advantage of identifying the fundament of a culture, 
and leaving space for a certain dynamism. It also shows that two different core-
cultures may share common features of the manifest culture, although coming 
from different positions like e.g. democracy, and thus also explain why there 
may be different understandings of the ‘same’ feature. 
 
 
(Figure 2) 
 
But first one question has to be answered, does culture matter? Looking back at 
the place of culture in social sciences, the answer in the 70s and 80s would have 
been negative. But as already mentioned has culture as important variable had 
its comeback since the 1990s4. In his contribution to an anthology on economic 
development and democracy (Huntington and Harrison 2000) David Lands 
answers the question affirmative (p. 2): “If we can learn anything from the 
history of economic development, it is that culture makes almost all the 
                                                          
4 E.g. Francis Fukuyama (The Great Disruption, Free Press, New York, 1999), Lawrence 
Harrison (Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind, University Press of America, Cambridge, 
1985) and Robert Putnam (Making Democracy Work, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
1993) 
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difference” but also “On the other hand, culture does not stand alone.” Ronald 
Inglehart forcefully argues the same case (2000/80): “Distinctive cultural zones 
exist and they have major social and political consequences, helping shape 
important phenomena from fertility rates to economic and […] democratic 
institutions”. And Huntington argued in 1997: “In the post-Cold War world, the 
most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or 
economical. They are cultural. […] People define themselves in terms of 
ancestry, religion, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with 
cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and at the 
broadest level, civilizations.”5
 
Thus there seem to be an argument for looking at the relation culture – regional 
integration (in the following RI or integration), especially as it – to min 
knowledge – is fairly underrated. The next step is to define ‘integration’. 
 
 
Regional Integration 
‘Regional integration’ includes two concepts ‘regional’ and ‘integration’; we 
will look at them both, with an emphasis on the latter. 
 
First of all the question arises, does one think of a sub-national region like a 
Danish or British county or does one think of supra-national regions, something 
larger that a state? In this context we look at supra-national regions. The concept 
‘supranational-region’ is ambivalent, and hard to operationalize as one sees it, in 
e.g. Buzan 1991(chapter 5). Michael Haas’ basic definition is: “any subset of the 
international system” (1970), but this is much too broad. As outset I use 
Thompson’s classical definition from 1973 as it, to my mind includes the 
essence of the concept ‘region’ as well as being operational: “[the] necessary 
and sufficient conditions for a regional subsystem [I consider a region = a 
regional subsystem, SD] includes: regularity and intensity of interactions so that 
a change in one part affects other parts; general proximity of actors; internal and 
external recognition of the subsystem as distinctive; and provisions of at least 
two, and probably more, actors in the subsystem”. This includes geographical 
space as well as some kind of contiguity. I will leave it at this, for the time 
being. 
 
The choice of the definition of ‘integration’ stands between a broad and a 
narrow definition. A broad definition would be to understand integration as the 
process leading to the establishment as well as the working of regimes6, which 
                                                          
5 Richard Shweder is very critical towards the emphasise on cultures importance (2000) 
6 The term ‘regime’ may sound a bit outdated after Keohane has down-graded it to a sub-
category of international institutions. But  I find Stephan Krasner's definition useful, as it is 
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eventually may turn into states. It would be ‘overstretching’ the regime 
definition if one claimed that a state was a regime (and vice-versa). But a regime 
may be the beginning of a state formation. Krasner’s famous definition of 
regimes is still very usable:  
 
“[...] Sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actor’s expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations”. 
 
This definition, and the addition of regimes as starting point of states, neither 
excludes the ambitious goal of establishing a federation, nor the less ambitious 
goal of a free trade area. Thus it is acknowledged that integration may have 
economic as well as political aspects.  
 
Karl W. Deutsch’s understanding of integration is comparably narrow. He 
defines it as “[…] a relationship among units in which they are mutually 
interdependent and jointly produce system properties which they would 
separately lack.” (1968/159). If the aim is to construct a supranational unit, the 
aim must consist of four elements (1968/192): “[…] 1) maintaining peace, 2) 
attaining greater multipurpose capabilities, 3) accomplishing some specific 
tasks, and 4) gaining a new self-image and role identity. 
 
Both of these definitions and their corollary contains a more or less explicitly 
stated cultural element, compared to most other definitions as e.g. William 
Wallace’s “the creation and maintenance of intense and diversified patterns of 
interaction among previously autonomous units” (1999 / 9). Walter Mattli 
defines integration as […] the process of internalising externalities that cross 
borders within a group of countries” (1999 / 190). This definition assumes that 
integration begins, when important groups, primarily economical, face problems 
in the cross-border transfer of e.g. goods and services. Thus it implicitly sees 
integration as an economic process, although not ruling out political courses 
completely. The definition allows for regional regimes of both economic (e.g. 
EFTA, ECSC) and political character (e.g. WEU, Council of Europe).  
 
As the aim of this essay is to analyse the role of culture in integration processes, 
I will opt for Deutsch’s definition and its corollary, focussing explicitly at 
ambitious integration projects aiming at close cooperation or even state-
formation.7
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
broad and avoids the connotations often linked to the term ‘institutions’ as being the same as 
an organisation. For a discussion of regime-theory, see Dosenrode 1992 pp 31-49. 
7 In this paper I consider the state the highest form of cooperation, the most encompassing and 
committed.  
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Preconditions for integration and the role of culture in integration theories8 
9
Integration does not ‘just start’ spontaneously, most scholars agree about that, 
but there are divergences about the preconditions for regional integration. In this 
section three approaches to integration will be analysed. 
 
Federalism 
According to the federal-realist approach two conditions must be met if a 
federation (which is the result of an integration process) should to be founded, 
(Riker 1964 / 12 f): 
 
“1. A desire on the part of the politicians who offer the bargain in order to 
expand their territorial control by peaceful means, either to meet an external 
military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for diplomatic aggrandizement. [...] 
 
2. The politicians who accept the bargain, giving up some independence for 
the sake of union, are willing to do so, because of some external military-
diplomatic threat or opportunity.[...]. And furthermore the desire for either 
protection or participation outweighs any desire they may have for 
independence. [...].” 
 
Later did Riker accept the comment of A. H. Birch, who insisted, that the 
perceived threat also could be caused by factors inside the state (Riker 1975 / 
114). In the same vain, one may add, that there is nothing in Riker's model 
suggesting, that one cannot expand the threat to a broader field than the military 
and diplomatic fields. The main concern must be that the threat is serious. In 
such a case the threat could also be of economic, social or political nature 
(McKay 1999 / 29 & 32). The important point in the political consideration is 
that the statesman believes that the threat he perceives can be countered by 
joining or founding a federation. And also implies that a unitary state may be 
turned into a federation, to save it from total disintegration, as was the case of 
                                                          
8 This section mainly focuses on the integration theories / approaches which see a state 
formation of some kind as the end of the integration process, thus e.g. functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism is not included.  
9 Constructivism: The starting-point of constructivism is that social interaction is the process 
that reproduces structures. Thus constructivists oppose the rationalism which is the basis for 
mainstream international relation theory including the traditional regional integration theories 
(Rosamond 2000/172).  (Social) constructivism has not tried to construct a comprehensive 
theory of regional integration. Instead the constructivist approaches have contributed to the 
understanding of e.g. collective identity formation and socialization processes (Risse 2006). 
Thus the constructivist approaches has been left out here.  
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Belgium in the 1990s and for several former British colonies. Federalisation has 
been a devise to handle cultural diversity threatening, ‘unity in diversity’. But 
the federations analysed by Riker all had a common core culture what may 
explain that he did not look at culture explicitly (and that is the same case for 
McKay only looking at the EU). 
 
K. C. Wheare (1963) is a representative of the federal-liberal tradition, and he 
lists a number of conditions for integration (1963/35 pp): 
  
1. “To begin with, the communities or states concerned must desire to be 
under a single independent government for some purpose at any rate” […] 
2. “They must desire at the same time to retain or to establish independent 
regional governments in some matters at least.” […] “They must desire to be 
united, but not to be unitary” […] 
3. “Federal government is not appropriate unless the communities concerned 
have the capacity as well as the desire to form an independent general 
government and to form independent regional governments.” 
 
Wheare then lists a number of preconditions to answer the question what leads 
states to desire integration, that is federation, and at the same time want to keep 
a certain independence including regional governments (1963/37): 
 
“Communities [nation states / SD] have been led to desire union from a 
variety of reasons. But in the modern federation some factors seem always to 
have been present  
- A sense of military insecurity and the consequent need for common 
defence. 
- A desire to be independent of foreign powers, and a realization that 
only through union could independence be secured. 
- A hope of economic advantage from union. 
- Some political association of the community concerned prior to their 
federal union either in a loose confederation […] or as parts of the 
same Empire, […]. 
- Geographical neighbourhood, 
- And similarity of political institutions.” 
 
Concerning culture Wheare is ‘woolly’; on the one hand, he states, that 
(1963/38): “It is interesting to notice that some factors are unexpectedly absent. 
Thus community of language, of race, of religion, of nationality have not been 
listed as likely essential prerequisites of the desire for union”, and (p. 39). “It is 
clear that, strong as these forces of language, race, religion and nationality are in 
producing a desire for union […] it has proven possible none the less to produce 
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a desire for union among peoples who differ in all these important particulars”.10 
On the other hand he later mentions divergence of nationality, differences of 
language, race and religion (1963/ 41) as factors running contrary to integration, 
and in the above list of preconditions he lists ‘similarity of political institutions’.  
 
Thus the federal traditions seem to share an agreement on the quest for security 
and independence, in a broad sense as important conditions for integration, 
whereas the cultural variable may play some kind of undefined but not essential 
role. The reason could be conceptual, a lack of definition of ‘culture’, as 
especially Wheare includes elements of ‘our’ definition but in a rather 
unsystematic fashion. 
 
Neo-Functionalism 
If any, the neo-functionalist approach has been synonymous with the European 
integration process. This close link has been its strength in the formative years 
of the EC, and its weakness since the mid 1960s. The founding father of the 
approach was Ernst Haas, who wrote his seminal work ‘The Uniting of Europe’ 
from 1958, and who continued to publish important contributions the next 
decade and a half. Other important contributions came from Leon Lindberg 
(1963), and Philippe Schmitter (1969, 1971). Haas starting-point was a criticism 
of David Mittrany’s functionalism from the 1940s. He combined functionalism 
with inspiration from Jean Monnet’s pragmatic approach to European 
integration. Contrary to the functionalists, Haas and his followers looked at 
regional integration, not universal, and they understood the integration process 
as political, not merely functional or technocratic.  
 
Haas’ original background conditions for regional integration were that the 
entities should poses pluralistic social structures, be substantially economic & 
industrial developed, and there should be a common ideological patterns among 
participating units. In other words Haas’ approach was limited to explaining 
integration in pluralistic democracies.  But one has to remember, that integration 
has taken place, on a voluntary basis, among others in the North German Tax-
Union and the United Dutch Provinces, too.  
 
In his cooperation with Philippe Schmitter, Haas tried to loosen the close 
binding to the European integration-project and give neo-functionalism a 
general applicability (1964). Their result was a model with background 
conditions (size of unit, rate of transactions, degree of pluralism, elite 
complementarity); conditions at the time of economic union (governmental 
purpose, powers and functions of the new institutions), and the process 
                                                          
10 The reason for this mistake could be that Whearer considers the protestant and catholic 
denominations as ‘different’ religions, whereas they in fact share the same core culture (cf. 
Dosenrode 1998).   
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conditions (style of decision making, growth rate of transactions, actors 
adaptability). Thus cultural considerations are part of their framework especially 
in the concepts of ‘pluralism’ and ‘style of decision making’. Culture also plays 
a part in their analysis of possibilities of Latin American unity (1964 pages 726, 
732, 733), but as a lesser important factor.  
 
A central concept was ‘spill-over’, the claim, that agreement on integration in 
one economic area would or could over time course other economic policy-areas 
to integrate, too, in order to secure the full benefit of the integration in the first 
policy-area. Over time, the integration would turn political. But, according to 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991/5) Haas, recognised, that a political kick in the right 
direction might be necessary, and that a high authority, looking after the 
integration projects common interest – not the individual member states – would 
be needed. The motives, the driving forces would be the pursuit of the 
politicians’ interests. 
 
The transfer of loyalty towards the new ‘unit’ was another key-question. Indeed 
Haas defined integration as (quoted by Rosamond in Brözel 2006/25):  
 
“Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
political activities to a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The result is a new political 
community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.”  
 
French president de Gaulle’s partly successful attempt to ‘renationalise’ the EC, 
put a stop to the hypothesis of a semi-automatic spill-over, and neo-
functionalism was criticised severely. But the criticisms lead to refinement of 
the approach (e.g. Joseph Nye1971).  
 
Schmitter sums Haas’ approach up in the following way (2005/257): 
 
“He [Haas; SD] hypothesized that, with the help of an active and resourceful 
secretariat and support from the organized interests affected by such 
externalities, national governments might (fitfully) learn and (reluctantly) 
agree to change their original positions.  According to this approach, 
integration is an intrinsically sporadic and conflictual process, but one in 
which, under conditions of democracy and pluralistic representation, national 
governments will find themselves increasingly entangled in regional pressure 
and end up resolving their conflicts by conceding a wider scope and 
developing more authority to the regional organizations they have created. 
Eventually, their citizens will begin shifting more and more of their 
expectations to the region and satisfying them will increase the likelihood that 
economic-social integration will ‘spill-over’ into political integration”. 
 10
 
The spill-over could happen if certain changes occurred (again Schmitter: 
2005/258): 
- increased interdependence between member-states 
- a crisis of  a certain size 
- development of a powerful regional bureaucracy 
- development of independent, regional interest organisations capable of 
acting in the region 
 
Apart from Schmitter’s earlier works his article from 2005 is very fruitful. In 
this article he reviews neo-functionalism as well as some of its critics. He argues 
that neo-functionalism was given up, too soon, and that it offers good 
explanations to the European integration-process during the 1980s and 1990s. 
But he also recognises shortcomings and emphasises which were put wrong 
(2005/ 261-62). 
 
Haas and Schmitter did mainly worked with European integration and the EC / 
EU has for some decades had a very high degree of integration, where as e.g. 
EFTA did not posses that. Schmitter’s   interpretation of neo-functionalisms 
most distinctive maxims is paradigmatic, and it is a central contributor from the 
‘new generation’ of neofunctionalists (2005 / 258 – 260):11
 
1. “States are not exclusive and may no longer be the predominant actors in 
the regional/international system” 
2. “Interests, rather than common ideals or identity, are the driving force 
behind the integration process,” [ but actors may learn and develop common 
ideals and identities]  
3. “Decisions about integration are normally taken with very imperfect 
knowledge of their consequences and frequently under the pressure of 
deadlines or impending crisis” 
4. “Functions or issue areas provide the usual foci for the integration process 
(at least in Western Europe), beginning with those that are initially 
considered the least controversial and, hence, easiest to deal with.” 
5. “Since actors in the integration process cannot be confined to existing 
national states or their interest groups and social movements […], a theory 
of it should explicitly include a role for supranational persons, secretariats, 
and associations whose careers, resources and expectations become 
increasingly dependent upon the further expansion of integrative tasks”. 
6. “[Actors ] Strategies with regard to integration are convergent, not 
identical” 
                                                          
11 This list is a resume of Schmitter’s list leaving out details. Schmitter himself draws on Haas 
1964 and 1958. 
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7. “Outcomes of international integration are neither fixed in advance by the 
founding treaty, nor are they likely to be expressed exclusively through 
subsequent formal agreements” 
 
One cannot help getting the impression, that Schmitter is moving towards a 
more realist interpretation of integration, in the same way as neo-realism and 
liberalism are getting closer.  
 
Schmitter analyses the strengths and weaknesses of neo-functionalism, and lists 
6 points (2005/266-67): 
 
• “There were, indeed, underlying interdependencies that may have taken 
some time to mature, but they did serve to compel actors into reaching 
agreements that were not initially intended. […] It is less clear, however, 
that the roles assigned to Eurocrats in the EC/EU secretariat and to the 
Euro-associations headquarters in Brussels in this process were so 
significant in this process of task expansion”12 
• The growth in EC / EU activities meet has raised the frequency of 
meetings between the national representatives as well as between the 
national representatives and the EU civil servants. “This seems to have 
induced important learning effects […] and even to have resulted in shifts 
in conceptions of national interests which may have been more important 
than the upward shift to regional interest politics predicted by 
neofunctionalists.”  
• “[…], the policy expansion […] has made it not only easier but even 
imperative to reach complex ‘log-rolls’ and ‘package-deals’ sufficient to 
extend further Community compétences and to buy out even the most 
recalcitrant of opponents. The process may even have crossed ‘the 
threshold of irreversibility’ […]” 
• “[…] much of what has happened since the mid-1970s can better be 
attributed to external trends and shocks than to purely internal processes 
and functional engrenage.”  [The capacity of the European nation states, 
to control external economic trends fell], but it is doubtful that this would 
have had such an impact [on the integration process] were it not for the 
generalized perception that Europe as a whole was declining relatively to 
other competing regions of the world.”  
• “In their singular concentration interdepencies rooted in production and 
exchange and, hence, the roles played by representatives of classes and 
sectors, the neofunctionalists tended to overlook very significant 
extensions of scope and, especially, the level of Community authority that 
                                                          
12 Could be right, but the European Roundtable of Industrials as well as Jacques Delors were 
important actors when launching the ESA. The later developments may be more doubtful.  
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were going on right under their noses – namely, as a result of the 
deliberations and decisions of the European Court of Justice.” 
• “Finally, neofunctionalists failed to recognize (or, at least, to 
‘problematize’) the significance of the enlargement of the EEC / EC to 
include new members” 
 
In other words, Schmitter recognises the importance of the national politicians 
as well as the environment, thus accommodation to frequent raise criticism. But 
is culture a variable here? Could it be that Schmitter, like Haas, implicitly only 
looks at integration in ‘cultural homogenous regions’? Neither Haas nor 
Schmitter uses the concept explicitly, but cultural elements occur e.g. in Haas 
original model as background variables (pluralist social structures, common 
ideological patterns, important elements which are included in the Haas-
Schmitter model). But the concept is not developed an sich. On the other hand, 
Schmitter considers ‘common ideals and identity’ as the result of integration, not 
a course for it. Thus the role of culture is unclear and ambivalent. 
 
Transactionalism 
Karl W. Deutsch’s (1912 – 1992) name is close of synonymous with 
‘transactionalism’ as approach to integration as he was the leader of its main 
project leading to the contribution ‘Political Community and the North Atlantic 
Area’ from 1957.  
 
As already mentioned does he isolate four main tasks of integration (1968/192): 
“[…] 1) maintaining peace, 2) attaining greater multipurpose capabilities, 3) 
accomplishing some specific tasks, and 4) gaining a new self-image and role 
identity”.  
 
These tasks are then, in the best behaviouristic tradition spelled out (cf. Deutsch 
1968/192). Peace is – quantitatively – measured by the absence of war as well as 
the lack of preparation of such. Multipurpose capabilities are indicated by the 
total GNP, its per capita GNP and the variety of undertakings. Specific tasks can 
be found by identifying common institutions, functions, resources etc., and a 
common role identity will be indicated by the use of common symbols, the 
creation of new ones, by the support and behaviour of elite and mass 
(1968/192): “including popular acceptance of unrequited transfers of wealth or 
other benefits within the community, and of some degree of sharing benefits and 
burdens within it”  
 
Then Deutsch goes on listing the background conditions for a successful 
integration process (1968 / 1992 p.): “The conditions of integration can again  be 
stated under four headings: (1) mutual relevance of the units to one another; (2) 
compatibility of values and some actual joint rewards; (3) mutual 
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responsiveness; and (4) some degree of generalized common identity or 
loyalty.”  
 
Whereas conditions 1 to 3 are fairly clear and grosso modo in accordance with 
e.g. the federalist and neo-functionalist approaches number 4 deserves a few 
words. According to Deutsch a common generalized loyalty can be measured by 
(1968/193):  
 
“[…] the frequency and saliency of perceptions of joint interests, both in 
terms of distributions of attention and of parallel expectations of reward, as 
shown by survey data and by the content analysis of mass media and 
government communications. Another indication would be the objective 
compatibility or consonance of the major values of the participating 
populations, permitting cooperation among them to be perceived as 
legitimate. This could be supplemented by indications of common subjective 
feelings of the legitimacy of the integrated community, making loyalty to it 
also a matter of internalized psychic compulsion.” 
 
Deutsch attaches importance to factors which belong to cultural aspects, 
according to my previous (short) conceptualisation. This becomes evident, when 
he goes on to define ‘identification’ as the (1968/193): “[…] the deliberate 
promotion of processes and sentiments of mutual identification, loyalties, and 
“we”-feelings.” The cultural variable’s importance becomes even clearer, when 
Deutsch discusses the ‘Essential background conditions’ for an amalgamated 
security community. 
 
In their 1957 book, Deutsch et al. analyses ‘security communities’ to see how 
zones of peace may develop. Their empirical material builds on about 36 
historic case studies. They understand integration and ‘amalgamation’ as 
different but partly overlapping. They defined integration as (1957/5): “[…] the 
attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and 
practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time, 
dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population”. And 
(1957/6) “By amalgamation we mean the formal merger of two or more 
previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of 
common government after amalgamation. This common government may be 
unitary or federal.”   
 
The interesting unit in our case is the amalgamated security community (ASC), 
as it is the most ambitious project, which may take on state form as a result of 
integration; whereas the ‘pluralist security community’ at the most is 
comparable to a confederation. On the basis of their case studies Deutsch et al. 
identifies five ‘essential requirements’ for the establishment of ASCs (1957/46-
69): 
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“1. Values and Expectations. [..] in regard to values, we found in all our cases 
a compatibility of the main values held by the politically relevant strata of all 
participating units. Sometimes this was supplemented by a tacit agreement to 
deprive of political significance any incompatible values that  
Might remain. […] Values were most effective politically when they were not 
held merely in abstract terms, but when they were incorporated in political 
institutions and in habits of political behaviour which permitted these values 
to be acted on in such a way as to strengthen people’s attachment to them. 
This connection […] we call a “way of life”, and it turned out to be crucial”. 
[…] In regard to expectations, we found that in all our cases amalgamation 
was preceded by  widespread expectations of joint rewards for the 
participating units, through strong economic ties or gains envisaged for the 
future” […]. 
2. Capabilities and Communication Processes. […] The most important of 
these conditions was an increase in the political and administrative 
capabilities of the main political units to be amalgamated. […] Another 
essential condition for amalgamation, closely related to the increase in 
capabilities, is the presence of markedly superior economic growth, […]. 
Another essential requirement for successful amalgamation was the presence 
of unbroken links of social communication between the political units 
concerned, and between the politically relevant strata within them. […] 
3. Mobility of persons. Another condition present in all our cases of successful 
amalgamation was the mobility of persons among the main units, at least in 
the politically relevant strata. […]. 
4. Multiplicity and Balance of Transactions. […] it appeared that successfully 
amalgamated security-communities require a fairly wide range of different 
common functions and services, together with different institutions and 
organizations to carry them out. […] 
5. Mutual Predictability of Behaviour. A final condition that may be essential 
for the success of amalgamation may be some minimum amount of mutual 
predictability of behaviour. […], we found in a number of our cases that 
mutual predictability of behaviour was eventually established upon a firm 
basis. This firm basis was the acquisition of a certain amount of common 
culture or of common group character or “national character”. 
 
Not surprisingly Deutsch et al also identified a number of factors which would 
either prevent or slowdown the integration respective amalgamation process, or 
break up an ASC (1957/59-65): 
 
1. Extensive military burdens have had a disintegrating effect. 
2. The participation of large amounts of citizens, which had not previously 
participated in politics, has strained the political system, especially if their 
participation has increased ethnic or linguistic differentiation. 
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3. Economic decline, over a longer period, has tended to weaken the 
capability of the government and the political elite. 
4. The political elites would have to be open to new members, and to be able 
to adjust to new circumstances, otherwise a counter-elite would be formed 
eventually with disintegration as the result. 
5. Unfulfilled expectations in social, economic, or political reforms could 
also lead to disintegration. 
 
To Deutsch (1968/198-99) the integration process begins when three situations 
occur and old habits are broken: 
 
1. Expectations of a new, common and better life must be present; 
expectations which create some kind of, latent, feeling of unity. 
2. The feeling of unity will be created by an external challenge which 
demands a united response 
3. A new generation of politicians has to arrive on the political scene, as 
younger people are less bound by past experiences and habits. 
 
Deutsch et al. wrote in a time, where, according to Huntington (2000/ xiii) 
culture was accepted in political science as a “crucial element in understanding 
societies, analyzing differences among them, and explaining their economic and 
political development”. Thus Deutsch’s emphasise on institutions and culture is 
in no way ‘suspect’, it lays in the then present tradition. But this element has 
been played down in most, if not all the following classical works on 
integration. Relating Deutsch et al’s work with the short discussion of ‘culture’ 
above is one of the aims of this essay. 
 
What makes Deutsch et al’s contribution so valuable is its broad empirical basis, 
but that it also its weakness, as some of the cases are very old and hardly helps 
us today (e.g. the uniting of Wales and England and the gathering of the 
Habsburg Empire with violence). Also the emphasise on the breaking of habits 
especially the expectation of a new and better life, united, is questionable – and 
as Deutsch generalizes the statement somewhat in the 1968 book compared to 
his 1957 book, he may have been aware of this. Only in an abstract way did the 
population of the 13 American colonies find a new “distinct way of life” 
(1957/85) from the beginning. But they did break political habits in so far as 
they seized self-determination, taking responsibility of their own lives. In this 
sense it is reasonable. To Deutsch culture played an important role. 
 
Culture is diffuse and hard to come to grips with, as described in section two. 
We  know that ‘culture’ was an acceptable variable to include in ones analysis at 
the time Haas, Riker, Whearer and Deutsch wrote their contributions to 
integration-theory yet only Deutsch specifically treated the issue, and Wheare 
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was unclear about it, but did admit its importance. Riker did not mention it at all, 
although he and Haas (and to a lesser degree Schmitter) included cultural 
elements in their work. One reason that Riker and Haas did not mention 
‘culture’ as an important variable, could be that their cases (Riker's federations 
and Haas’ ECSC) were basically culturally homogenous, and thus this variable 
was not important. In their joint work from 1964 Haas and Schmitter included 
cultural variables although not in a systematic way.  
 
 
Culture and Regional Integration 
If culture is hard to come to grips with, as described in section two, perhaps that 
is one explanation why culture as independent variable has only been included 
unsystematically in some of the theoretical approaches to regional integration 
theory; the expectation being transaction analysis. But today realists like Samuel 
Huntington are beginning to consider culture an important variable, and so do 
the ‘liberals’, when discussing the importance of ‘norms and rules’ in relation to 
institutions. The (counter-) argument, that e.g. European integration is based on 
adherence to rules, democratic principles and a common understanding of 
human rights is no genuine argument for leaving culture or religion out of the 
analysis, as these two constitute the fundament upon which the former are based. 
Thus there seem to be reason for looking further at the importance of culture in 
relation to regional integration.  
 
A tentative working hypothesis could be that some kind of cultural homogeneity 
is an important precondition for supranational integration13. The argument 
would be, that engaging in close cooperation both at the governmental level and 
among citizens, NGOs and companies are facilitated if one shares a common 
understanding of what is right and what is wrong and ‘how things are done’ in 
other words, the same basic or core culture (But one has to remember, that 
culture is not static but it develops – slowly). This implies that manifest cultures 
of two cultures which were once overlapping may once develop in opposite 
directions.  
 
When looking at the relationship culture – regional integration on the 
background of the previous sections (and here only looking at culture, leaving 
aside other important variables) I expect the following five working hypothesis:  
 
• a durable integration, with the highest aspirations (e.g. state formation) 
should share a common core culture as well as manifest culture to be 
successful (H.1) 
                                                          
13 It would blow the frame of this essay, but a comparison of the above approaches to 
integration begs for several other aspects to be analysed empirically: the importance of crisis, 
of a secretariat general, of economic gains, of interdependence / globalisation … 
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• Integration projects sharing core cultures, but not manifest cultures are 
‘crisis prone’ but they will be able to develop common manifest cultures, 
and thus turn more stabile (H. 2)14. 
• An integration project only sharing common manifest culture is prone to 
get into crisis, as (manifest) culture develop and no common core culture 
is present. (H. 3) 
• Integration projects where the constituting units do not share a common 
core culture or a common manifest culture are also prone to fall apart. 
One way to solve the problems of the categories 2 and 3 is, of course, to 
construct a federation, but again a federation is most likely to succeed for 
the cases where the units share a common core culture. (H. 4). 
• As an additional hypothesis one could add, that lesser ambitious projects 
may work out, as long as the participants share features of the manifest 
culture. (H. 5) 
 
 Sharing core 
culture 
Not sharing core 
culture 
Sharing 
manifest 
culture 
H.1 
Germany 
 
 
H.3 
South Africa 
 
Not sharing 
manifest 
culture 
H.2 
United Arab Republic 
 (1958-1961) 
 
H.4 
Soviet Union 
(1919-1991) 
 
 
Tab. 1: Relationship culture – regional integration ‘the strait cases’ 
 
Naturally a serious empirical survey is necessary, but that is unfortunately not 
possible in this working paper. But a list of integration projects chosen at 
random (appendix A) lends some plausibility to the working hypothesis. The list 
is grouped in the four mentioned categories. The list indicates:  
(a) That a shared common core and manifest cultures is an advantage when one 
would like to integrate (German Federation, Brazilian Federation, Argentine 
Federation), but also that a common core and manifest culture do not provide a 
guarantee for integration to happen (e.g. the Nordic countries are absent as a 
‘state’). Additionally considering core and manifest cultures do not prevent a 
crisis not to happen (the troublemakers of the EU at the time of writing are 
Britain, Poland and the Czech Republic, all sharing common core and manifest 
culture). (b) In the same vein shared core and manifest cultures are no guarantee 
                                                          
14 Establishing a federation is one way of solving divergences in the manifest culture (e.g. 
Switzerland). 
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to for states to keep united (Czechoslovakia, Denmark-Iceland, Sweden-
Norway).  
 
(c) Projects with matching core cultures but diverging manifest cultures may 
very well keep together (Belgium, Canada, Switzerland), although ‘obvious 
matches’ like the West Indian Federation or the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland show the difficulties statesmen have to face, and the United Arab 
Republic did not last long either. 
(d) The category I expected to be very crisis prone, the one with shared manifest 
culture but no core culture, boasts a number of federations, and they are doing 
well in spite of religious and racial tensions (e.g. South Africa, Nigeria), thus 
indicating that a ‘marriage of convenience’ may be very solid. It is of course 
worth wile remembering that these two states are federal systems. 
 
(e) Not surprisingly the fourth category contains states (and ex-states) which try 
to keep together with military force (e.g. USSR, Russia, and India) and which 
did not share cultural features. (g) Altogether the list indicates that it is 
important to look at other variables too  In other words, would one like to make 
predictions as to the sustainability of regional integration projects, the cultural 
variable indicates a trend, not a law and cannot stand alone. Still a common core 
and manifest culture seem to be important for successful, sustainable regional 
integration; they simplify matters. If one of them isn’t present a number of 
counter measures should be taken like e.g. establishing a federation rather than a 
unitary state.  On the other hand, a common and manifest culture is no guarantee 
for successful integration (Czechoslovakia, Denmark-Iceland, Sweden-Norway). 
Thus culture ought to be a variable in the theories of regional integration. The 
exact importance of culture as variable needs further empirically based research. 
 
 Sharing core 
culture 
Not sharing core 
culture 
Sharing 
manifest 
culture 
H.1 
Scandinavia 
(A state did not emerge) 
 
Czechoslovakia 
(Fell apart) 
 
H.3 
(United States of 
America?) 
 
Not sharing 
manifest 
culture 
H.2 
West Indies 
(The federation fell apart) 
H.4 
India 
(The federation survives) 
 
 
Tab. 2: Relationship culture – regional integration: the ‘odd cases’ remind us to be cautious 
when applying ‘culture’ as explanation when integration-projects fail or succeed. 
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How would this ‘demand for inclusion’ of the cultural variable fit regional 
integration theories? When analysing regional integration, the classical theories 
of regional integration, federalism, neo-functionalism and transactionalism as a 
rule had culturally homogeneous regions as their cases. This may, on the one 
hand, explain why culture (manifest or core) was not a central issue to 
federalism and neo-functionalism, contrary to transactionalism, which also 
looked at cases where culture could play a role. When cultural variables were 
touched upon, it was the manifest elements not core-culture. On the other hand, 
the neglect of the cultural variable does not mean that it cannot be incorporated 
into them. It is the claim of this paper, that it would indeed be beneficial.  
 
 20
Appendix 1 
 
 
A tentative list of ambitious integration-projects: 
Matching core and manifest cultures: 
Argentine 
Australia 
Austria 
Brazil 
Czechoslovakia (1918-2002) 
Comoros 
Denmark-Iceland (fifteenth century – 1943) 
Ethiopia 
Germany 
Mexico 
Micronesia 
Pakistan 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
Sweden-Norway (1814-1905) 
United Arab Emirates 
 
Matching core cultures, diverging manifest cultures: 
Belgium 
Canada 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1958-1963) 
Switzerland 
United Arab Republic (1958-1961) 
United States of America (perhaps) 
West Indian Federation (1958-1962) 
 
Matching manifest cultures, diverging core cultures: 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  
European Union after the last enlargement 
Malaysia 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Venezuela (?) 
 
No matching core and manifest cultures: 
India (e.g. Punjab) 
Russia (e.g. Tjetenia)  
Soviet Union (1919-1991) 
Yugoslavia (1918-2001) 
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